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Abstract
The Japanese Prefecture of Kumamoto experienced a series of strong earthquakes in
April 2016 causing widespread damage and had a serious impact on local commu-
nities. The events caused over 3000 casualties and affected the continuity of health-
care services. Many hospitals had to be evacuated but the reasons for this evacuation
are clear. [AQ: 3]This research aims to investigate the impact of damage on the per-
formance of the healthcare service through a survey of 118 healthcare facilities. The
study connects earthquake metrics and the loss of healthcare service functionality
and reveals the reasons for which facilities were totally or partially evacuated.
Findings suggest that the reasons are mainly due to damage to the buildings, critical
systems, and medical equipment. It concludes by estimating that the stricken areas
lost approximately 15% of their healthcare functionality. The study also concludes
that the current building standards increased the performance of hospital buildings
by approximately 10%; however, more attention is needed to protect architectural
and critical systems.
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Introduction
The Japanese Prefecture of Kumamoto and neighboring regions have a long history of
large seismic events some of which date back to 1889 (Kato et al., 2016). Among the latest
events, those which took place in April 2016, a series of ‘‘shallow, moderate to large earth-
quakes’’ took place in Kumamoto City (Kato et al., 2016). Seven of these earthquakes were
powerful enough to cause significant damage in the region. The Japan Meteorological
Agency (JMA) estimations suggest that five of these events measured 62 and 6+ and two
measured 7 on its seismic intensity scale (see Table 1) elucidating the severe shaking and
the extensive destruction in central Kyushu. The foreshock took place on 14 April 2016 at
9:26PM (M = 6.5) followed by the main shock approximately 28 h later, 16 April 2016 at
1:25AM (M = 7.3) Japan local time. Due to their significance and the damage they
caused, these two earthquakes will be the focus of this research.
The population of Kumamoto Prefecture is approximately 1.7 million, about 44% of
whom live in Kumamoto City, in the central area of Kyushu Island, southwest Japan.
This population is exposed not just to earthquakes but also to volcanoes and floods which
make researchers question the adequacy of preparedness in the region (Nagata et al., 2017)
despite research findings that suggest the recovery process was relatively fast. For example,
the main shock caused power shortage to 476,600 customers, approximately 6.5 h later
this number dropped to 181,300 (i.e. 38%), and the service was fully restored on 20 April,
and just 16 days after the event, water and gas supplies were fully restored (Nojima and
Maruyama, 2016). A total of 194,888 buildings were damaged, of which 42,786 partially
and totally collapsed, forcing 183,882 people to evacuate and spread over the 855 shelters
most of which were schools (Sasabuchi et al., 2018). The City comprises 1267 schools, 134
of which tagged red (dangerous), 354 yellow (unsafe), and 779 green (safe) (Earthquake
Engineering Field Investigation Team (EEFIT), 2017), indicating the reduced capacity
authorities had to deal with to respond to the disaster.
The events caused death to 273 and injury to 2809 people, many of whom (42.8%,
N = 1203) required immediate healthcare, which was not fully functional (Fire and
Disaster Management Agency (FDMA), 2019). Some hospitals suffered severe structural
and utility lifeline shortages (Tang and Eidinger, 2017), and many had to be evacuated
imposing a new challenge for authorities to deal with the victims effectively. The Prefecture
Table 1. Earthquakes with intensity of 6 and above
Date and time (Japan
local time)
Hypocenter JMA magnitude JMA seismic intensity
Category Meter reading
14 April 2016 at 21:26 Kumamoto Chiho,
Kumamoto Prefecture
6.5 7 ø6.5
14 April 2016 at 22:07 5.8 62 5.5–5.9
15 April 2016 at 00:03 6.4 6+ 6.0–6.4
16 April 2016 at 01:25 7.3 7 ø6.5
16 April 2016 at 01:45 5.9 62 5.5–5.9
16 April 2016 at 03:55 Aso Chiho, Kumamoto
Prefecture
5.8 6+ 6.0–6.4
16 April 2016 at 09:48 Kumamoto Chiho,
Kumamoto Prefecture
5.4 62 5.5–5.9
JMA: Japanese Meteorological Agency.
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comprises 1696 healthcare facilities, including 1482 clinics and 214 hospitals, 94 of which
are in the City (Nagata et al., 2017).
A substantial amount of research has been conducted about the response of hospitals
to these earthquakes; however, the vast majority of this work focused on the evacuation
of hospitals without detailed analysis that clarifies the reason behind these evacuations.
This study investigates the impact of the damage of healthcare infrastructure on the per-
formance of the service. It increments the limited knowledge of post-disaster healthcare
evaluation to support Japanese authorities enhance the resilience of healthcare and inter-
national strategies specifically those set by the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk
Reduction 2015–2030.
Literature review
Kumamoto City Hospital is one of the hospitals that was most severely affected by the
earthquake leading to the loss of 58% of its bed capacity (Nagata et al., 2017). Nagata
et al. (2017) reported that the main shock resulted in the loss of 55.9% (N = 1156) of bed
capacity across 12 hospitals (see Table 2) due to damage. The evacuation included a wide
range of hospitals, such as general, psychiatry (Yanagawa et al., 2017), and even neonatal
(Iwata et al., 2017). Yanagawa et al. (2017) suggest that 25% (N = 894) of patients were
evacuated due to fear of building collapse or the low performance of utility lifeline systems
(including fire safety system). They indicated that there is a relationship between the age
of the hospital building and the number of evacuees, but they have not confirmed this
relationship.[AQ: 4]
Literature suggests that Japan is learning from its previous experience specifically that
of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake when hospitals were unable to withstand the
tsunami waves and evacuation was viewed as one of the weaknesses. This explains the rea-
son for which many researchers focused on the evacuation of hospitals following the
Kumamoto earthquakes. Nagata et al. (2017) concluded that the Kumamoto experience
highlighted some improvement in the Japanese approach of disaster management, specifi-
cally in terms of decision-making speed, communication between emergency responders,
patient distribution, and coordination, all of which resulted in no death records among
Table 2. Sample of the evacuated hospitals (Adapted from Nagata et al. (2017))
Hospital Bed capacity Evacuated patients Ratio (evacuee per bed, %)
Kumamoto City 556 323 58
Kumamoto Central 308 200 65
Higashi Kumamoto 52 43 83
Nishimura 96 96 100
Miyakonomori 199 64 32
Mashiki 210 Unkna Unkn
Kibougaoka 177 Unkna Unkn
Yamanami 270 Unkna Unkn
Aoba 178 Unkna Unkn
Koyanagi 198 Unkna Unkn
Yamaguchi 72 Unkna Unkn
Jyonan 198 Unkna Unkn
a
Unkn = Exact number is unknown, but total evacuees reached 430 patients.
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transferred patients. Nevertheless, the governmental decision-making process remains an
issue, as Kumamoto and its surrounding regions do not have the same level of prepared-
ness as those in the East, that is, Nankai Trough (Yanagawa et al., 2017). This could be
due to the lack of resources and tools to support the decision-making process with neces-
sary evidence and timely information. There is an agreement between researchers in
Japan, the United Kingdom (UK), and perhaps elsewhere that there is a need to develop a
real-time system that can provide information about the availability of resources pre-,
peri-, and immediately post-disaster to help the decision-making process manage disasters
more effectively (Achour et al., 2015; Nagata et al., 2017). Such a system requires a sub-
stantial amount of information some of which are related to a better understanding of
how healthcare operates and responds to hazards.
Healthcare provision is a highly dependent system that relies on the performance of its
physical components, lifeline services, supply chains, in addition to a set of management
processes and highly skilled staff who need to guarantee the coherent operation and con-
nection between all these systems. The performance of the healthcare service thus depends
on the performance of all these components and any damage they experience could result
in disruption to the service. For example, bridge damage would affect associated health-
care waiting and travel times (Dong and Frangopol, 2017); interruption of utility lifeline
systems would cause inoperability (Achour et al., 2014; Myrtle et al., 2005), evacuation of
hospital (Yanagawa et al., 2017), and even death when it is not restored on time (Takeda
et al., 2012). The World Health Organization (WHO, 2015) suggests that hospital opera-
tions in disasters depend on three major elements namely, structural, non-structural, and
functional; however, Achour et al. (2011) argue that this classification is not informative
enough suggesting that hospital operations depend on building integrity, utility lifelines,
equipment, staff, and supplies. Mahmoudi and Mohamed (2018) investigated metrics asso-
ciated with the performance of healthcare functionality suggesting the need to develop a
set of more comprehensive metrics to measure the resilience of the service ignoring the fact
that the WHO Hospital Safety Index (HSI) (WHO, 2015) has been developed to provide
such information. The literature reveals a large set of tools and metrics to assess the resili-
ence of healthcare service before disasters; however, there is limited knowledge about the
connection between the damage of the infrastructure and the functionality of the health-
care service post-disasters. This research aims to investigate the impact of damage on the
performance of the healthcare service following Kumamoto earthquakes. The study
searches for (1) the connection between the earthquake metrics (ground motions, seismic
intensity, and distance from seismic faults) and the performance of healthcare facilities,
and (2) reasons for which facilities were totally or partially evacuated. The study provides
a set of recommendations to help Japanese authorities enhance healthcare resilience and
information for the international body of knowledge to support the promotion of the resi-
lience of healthcare systems as part of the international Sendai Framework for Disaster
Risk Reduction strategy.[AQ: 5][AQ: 6]
Research methodology
Data collection
Data were collected through the distribution of a questionnaire survey to 389 healthcare
facilities (public and private hospitals and clinics). The survey was sent by post in July
2016, and facilities were given 6 weeks to respond to 28 questions covering five areas: build-
ing integrity, lifeline damage, medical equipment, post-earthquake medical service, and
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generic information about the facility. Responders were asked to report damage to items
and to rate the effect of that damage on the medical performance using Likert-type scale
(No/slight effect, Moderate effect, and Severe effect). For example, participants were asked
to provide information about lifeline interruption, report the cause of the interruption
(internal or external), and rate its impact on the health service. In addition, they were
requested to provide details of evacuation (e.g. number of evacuees and means of transfer).
A distribution of peak ground acceleration (PGA) in Kumamoto is estimated by the
Earthquake Disaster Management Division of the National Institute for Land and
Infrastructure Management (NILIM, http://www.nilim.go.jp/lab/rdg/index.htm). Data
were complemented by literature review and earthquake metrics (e.g. PGAs and seismic
intensities), and distance of hospitals from the fault line draws a more comprehensive pic-
ture of the situation and provides better explanation of what caused healthcare provision
to fail in some areas.
Data analysis
Data were screened, coded, and analyzed for reliability using SPSS, Cronbach’s alpha =
0.732 denoting an acceptable level of internal consistency. It was then arranged into three
logical categories: building integrity, critical systems, and medical equipment to understand
how each of these categories affected the functionality of hospitals. The impact of each
item’s (i.e. component) damage/inoperability was assessed by the responder according to
the Likert-type scale and associated a numerical score (Si) to reflect the impact on health-
care processes (see equation 1). A score of 1.00 denotes the absence of impact on the
healthcare process and total operation; a score of 0.65 denotes the moderate impact and
partial operation; and 0.35 denotes the severe impact and limited operation. Table 3 illus-
trates the response received from hospital H136 (critical systems) and associated scores.
This scoring system provides an easy way to understand the level of operation of each hos-
pital by providing a value between 0 and 1.
Si =
1:00; No or Slight impact
0:65; Moderate impact
0:35; Severe impact
8><
>:
ð1Þ
Table 3. Scoring process (H136, critical systems)
Impact level (hospital’s rating) Score
(Si)
Item No/Slight Moderate Severe
Fixing and furniture 1 1.00
Power supply 1 0.65
Water supply 1 0.65
Gas supply 1 0.65
Landline 1 1.00
Cell phone 1 1.00
Internet 1 0.65
Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning 1 0.65
Elevator 1 0.65
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Using item scores Si, category scores (Sc) were calculated as the summation of all its
items scores (Si) taking into account the importance of each item by applying weighting
coefficient (ai) as shown in equation 2. The approach of weighting coefficients is widely
used in evaluation work. Change et al. (1995) weighed essential facilities as part of seismic
evaluation in Tennessee, and WHO (2015) proposed different models of weighting in its
HSI to fit with the needs of countries and tackle particular vulnerabilities. In study, weight-
ing coefficients were empirically estimated based on the criticality of the component fol-
lowing the WHO (2015) HSI approach, which allocates higher scores to the most critical
items. Weighting coefficients are set to help hospitals identify their key components and
that there are sufficient measures to ensure their resilience. Components with high risk to
compromise the building safety or paralyze hospital operation were associated with the
highest weighting scores as a way of reflecting their criticality (e.g. columns, beams, power,
water, and gas supplies). Walls and telecommunication systems (e.g. landline, cell phones,
and the Internet) are important components for protecting the hospital building and for
maintaining the connection internally and externally. Doors, fixings and furniture, despite
the major role they play, are the least important for the operation and safety of buildings
and patients and for that they were associated with the lowest coefficients. During the
screening, we noticed that although healthcare facilities share the same components for the
building and critical systems, there was a contrast between the equipment they had due to
the service each facility provides. The same scoring approach has been maintained; how-
ever, the number of components, and thus their relative scores, varies between hospitals
(see Table 4 for numerical values of ai).
Sc =
Xn
i= 1
ai3Sið Þ ð2Þ
where Si is the score of each item (assessed by the responder), ai is the weight coefficient
for each item (sum of ai = 100), Sc is the score for each category, building (Scb), critical
system (Scs), and medical equipment (Sce), n is the total number of items in each category.
SH =
Scb + Scs + Sce
3
ð3Þ
Hospital overall scores (SH) were estimated to be the average score of the three relevant
category scores for building (Scb), critical systems (Scs), and medical equipment (Sce), see
equation 3. SH scores help understanding the performance of hospitals and the causes of
evacuation. The value of SH varies between 0% and 100%; it indicates the existence or
absence of damage that affected the functionality of the hospital. As the score gets lower,
the probability of damage severity, inoperability, and need for evacuation increase.
Major hospitals are often classified into primary, secondary, and tertiary according to
their role during disasters. Primary hospitals deal with minor and less serious injuries,
which are often the major proportion of disaster casualties. The lack of functionality of a
primary hospital means impacts on large number of injuries. Secondary and tertiary hospi-
tals deal with more complicated, but limited number of, injuries and thus the impact of
their inoperability is relatively limited, yet clinically more critical. Simpact is developed to
overcome the limitation of the SH scores in exemplifying this impact on local communities.
Simpact is associated with each hospital emergency rating and can be calculated as per equa-
tion 4.
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Simpact =bH3SH ð4Þ
where bH is the weighting coefficient associated with the hospital emergency classification.
For primary, b = 0.70; secondary, b = 0.80; tertiary, b = 0.90; and for unrated hospital,
b = 1.00, and SH is hospital’s overall score
Research findings
Questionnaire results
Often researchers focus their studies only on emergency-response hospitals due to their
role in providing healthcare to disaster-associated injuries. Although this is an important
aspect of disaster management, it neglects the critical role ‘‘non-emergency’’ healthcare
facilities play in maintaining the routine healthcare service during disaster times. This
study acknowledges the importance of the role all healthcare facilities play during disasters
in spite of their emergency classification. In fact, between 14 and 16 April 2016, this study’s
responding hospitals accepted 6688 patients (i.e. 2.4 times the total number of injuries
associated with the earthquake) demonstrating that 60% of healthcare seekers were not
Table 4. Categories and components
Weight (ai) Hospital H130 H135 H136
Building integrity 0.15 Outer wall 0.35 1.00 0.65
0.15 Inner wall 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.17 Pillars / columns 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.17 Beams 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.08 Window 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.10 Flooring 0.35 1.00 1.00
0.10 Ceiling 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.08 Door 1.00 1.00 1.00
Critical systems 0.07 Fixing and furniture 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.15 Power supply 1.00 1.00 0.65
0.15 Water supply 0.35 0.35 0.65
0.15 Gas supply 0.65 1.00 0.65
0.10 Landline 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.10 Cell phone 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.10 Internet 1.00 1.00 0.65
0.09 Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning 1.00 1.00 0.65
0.09 Elevator 0.65 1.00 0.65
Equipment Variable Artificial dialysis – – –
X-ray fluoroscope 1.00 1.00 1.00
File development machine – 0.35 1.00
Blood test machine 1.00 1.00 –
CT scanner – – –
MRI scanner 1.00 – –
Cardiac catheter – – –
Life support device – – –
Automatic dividing powder plane 1.00 1.00 –
Nurse call system 1.00 1.00 1.00
Building score (Scb) 0.84 1.00 0.95
Critical system score (Scs) 0.82 0.90 0.74
Equipment score (Sce) 1.00 0.87 1.00
Hospital score (SH) 0.88 0.92 0.90
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earthquake-related and thus emphasizes the need to focus studies on all healthcare provi-
ders as an approach to build the resilience of the entire healthcare system.
Out of the 389 healthcare facilities, 125 (32%) hospitals and clinics responded. The
major proportion of these were from Kumamoto Prefecture (87%, N = 109) and the
remaining from Oita Prefecture (13%, N = 16). Facilities were exposed to a seismic inten-
sity of 3–6 on the JMA scale, indicating that light to heavy damage to building could be
noticed. For example, building contents may have suffered major damage due to shaking,
and lifeline supplies may have experienced serious damage and interruptions due to pipe
and network damage.
Most of the responding facilities are unclassified emergency facilities (64%, N = 75)
followed by primary (17%, N = 20), secondary (16%, N = 19), and tertiary (3%,
N = 4). Data were screened for missing critical information, such as details about the
structural, non-structural, and equipment categories. This resulted in the exemption of
seven facilities from the study sample, six unrated, and one primary which leave 118 facili-
ties to be considered eligible for the analysis spread over the two prefectures and cities/
towns (see Table 5).
Loss of functionality
Analysis suggests that stricken areas lost 15% of their healthcare functionality. In total,
40% (N = 44) of healthcare facilities lost between 16% and 50% of their functionality,
the remaining 60% (N = 71) lost up to 15% per facility implying significant impact on the
local community. Damage to buildings, critical systems, and equipment played a role in
reducing the performance of facilities and highlighted the lack of preparedness in many
hospitals. Cities, such as Aso-shi, Shimomashiki-gun, Kita-ku, and Uki-shi, were subject
Table 5. Distribution of responding healthcare facilities per area
Prefecture Area JMA intensity—
Read / (categorized)
Functionality
(%)
Number of
facilities
Proportion of
the responding
sample (%)
Kumamoto Chuo-ku 6.1 / (6+ ) 85.8 23 20
Kita-ku 5.9 / (62) 87.6 7 6
Higashi-ku 6.1 / (6+ ) 83.7 17 15
Nishi-ku 5.9 / (62) 87.6 6 5
Minami-ku 6.2 / (6+ ) 85.0 8 7
Uki-shi 5.4 / (5+ ) 81.6 5 4
Kamimashiki -gun 5.1 / (5+ ) 89.4 6 5
Shimomashiki-gun 5.6 / (62) 100.0 1 1
Aso-gun 5.3 / (5+ ) 75.9 6 5
Tamana-shi 5.0 / (5+ ) 85.3 8 7
Kikuchi-ku 4.7 / (52) 90.6 5 4
Uto-shi 6.3 / (6+ ) 82.6 3 3
Goshi-shi 6.1 / (6+ ) 82.9 3 3
Hitoyoshi-shi 4.3 / (4) 91.5 9 8
Aso-shi 5.5 / (62) 68.7 2 2
Oita Beppu-shi 4.7 / (52) 90.5 14 12
Yuhu-shi 3.3 / (3) 100.0 1 1
Kuzu-gun 4.1 / (4) 85.8 1 1
JMA: Japanese Meteorological Agency.
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to an intensity of 5 lost 32%, 0%, 12%, and 18% of their healthcare functionality, respec-
tively. Kuzu-gun and Chuo-ku lost approximately 15% despite being subject to seismic
intensities of 4 and 6, respectively (see Table 4). Keeping in mind that risk is a function of
exposure, location, hazard, and vulnerability, this difference in the performance of hospi-
tals in stricken areas indicates that the loss of functionality is driven mostly by the vulner-
ability of each hospital more than the intensity of the earthquake. A Pearson’s correlation
analysis was conducted to identify the relationship between the seismic intensity in stricken
areas and loss of functionality. It demonstrated that there is a moderate decreasing correla-
tion between the functionality and the seismic intensity (R = 20.437) between the stricken
areas. The correlation decreases further at the level of facilities (R = 20.125) indicating
that the location of the facility, although is an important factor, is less important than its
level of preparedness.
On average, emergency classified hospitals lost 25% of their functionality and tertiary
hospitals suffered the highest loss. Table 5 illustrates the functionality both before and
after weighting (10% for tertiary hospital). While most healthcare facilities suffered an
average loss of 7% before the application of the impact coefficients (bH), tertiary hospitals
suffered 18%. Tertiary hospitals deal with the most complicated type of injuries, often use
stricter measures and more advanced systems that require continuous supplies. Any
adverse change in their supplies or critical measures will lead to impact on the quality of
their operation and thus result negatively on participant’s scoring.
Table 6 illustrates that the loss of functionality among the unclassified, primary, and
secondary hospitals before weighting was around 7% (average SH = 93%). This similarity
indicates that the resilience level of healthcare service in the area of Oita and Kumamoto is
comparable. This similarity also strengthens the argument of considering all healthcare
facilities in any disaster resilience work as these are not just important for the continuity of
the healthcare service but also reflect the quality of the policies and regulations and their
application in practice. Japanese building regulations force designers to design only struc-
tures, yet designers often follow the ‘‘Seismic Design and Construction Guideline for
Building-equipment’’ to enhance the understanding of resilience of buildings from the
safety of structures to full operation post-disasters.
The above strengths do not eliminate the fact that many healthcare facilities failed to
operate, some of them were partially destroyed (Sasabuchi et al., 2018) and that ‘‘out of 2530
medical and dental clinics, structures or equipment were destroyed in 1302 institutions.’’ This
section investigated the overall impact of the earthquakes on the performance of the health-
care system. The following sections investigate the performance of buildings, critical systems,
and medical equipment in detail and reveals how these affected evacuations.
Table 6. Average functionality of healthcare per emergency rating
Functionality (%)
Not weighted Weighted
Not classified 92.8 92.8
Classified 92.8 74.5
Primary 95.2 74.1
Secondary 92.4 75.0
Tertiary 82.3 74.1
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Building integrity
Due to the complexity and incoherence of results, it is more appropriate to use the build-
ing functionality scores (Scb). Many facilities suffered damage to one of the factors (i.e.
building, critical systems, or equipment), applying the impact coefficient (bH) or using the
hospital overall score (SH) would adversely affect their scoring and will lead to incorrect
information.
Out of the 118 hospitals, 27 facilities (23%) lost part of their building integrity due to
damage to structural and/or architectural components, such as beams, walls, and ceilings.
Japan revised its building regulations in 1981. However, 17 of the damaged buildings are
35 years old or less and are built according to the current building standards and regula-
tions. The remainder were built between 1925 and 1980 and thus built according to the ear-
lier standards and regulations. Findings suggest that there is a tendency toward higher risk
of damage as the building gets older and that buildings in higher seismic intensity tend to
be more affected (see Figure 1). The average loss of functionality of pre-1981 is 17%, while
the post-1981 loss is 7% denoting an approximate functionality improvement of 10%
made by the current regulations. The damage to structural components has decreased dra-
matically; however, architectural components sustained damage (see Figure 2). Ceilings
were the most apparent components as 35%–-40% of the facilities reported moderate to
severe damage.
Figure 3 indicates that building damage decreases as PGA increases confirming the role
ground motion plays a role in causing building damage. Within these damaged buildings,
inner wall damage was the most occurring (41%) followed by damage to ceilings (average
of 37%), flooring, and outer walls (33%). Most of this damage was found in non-structural
components (e.g. ceilings) and has been described as slight to moderate, indicating the
strictness of the Japanese regulations and quality of construction. These regulations suc-
ceeded in reducing building collapse but should include architectural components to reduce
the risk of loss of functionality, injuries and even death should they fail to operate ade-
quately during earthquakes.
Distance from the fault line was another factor that affected the performance of the
facilities (see Figure 4). Facilities located within 20 km of the fault line tend to suffer more
damage than those located beyond the 20 km range due to the low seismic intensity com-
bined with the quality of building’s design and construction.
Further analysis was conducted to understand the details of how buildings responded
to the seismic activities. The least performing buildings (Scb\ 80%) were selected from
the sample and compared to buildings with similar characteristics (e.g. age and seismic
intensity). Three hospitals were found suitable for this comparison. Hospitals H110
(Scb = 63%), H112 (Scb = 65%), and H278 (Scb = 78%) suffered damage to their struc-
tural and architectural components and reported that this damaged affected their opera-
tions. These were matched with hospitals with similar characteristics (see Table 7). The
table illustrates that even though there is a connection between the age of the building and
its performance, this performance varies between buildings denoting the characteristics of
each building. Despite the age, seismic intensity and PGA buildings responded different on
individual level (see Figure 5) which indicates that specification of each building which is
driven by its location, exposure (e.g. seismic intensity, PGA, etc.), the way it was designed,
built, and maintained. Achour et al. (2011) reached the same conclusion explaining that
construction flaws, construction materials, quality of design, and maintenance affect the
response of buildings and are usually behind the contrasting responses. This study has
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confirmed this conclusion and provided quantitative evidence to support it and supple-
ment that location and hazard greatness dictate how a building responds.
Critical system
More than 71% of the hospitals (N = 84) reported loss of functionality to at least one of
their critical systems varying from 2% (Scs = 98%) to 34% (Scs = 66%). Approximately
48% of the affected hospitals (N = 40) lost up to 10% of their functionality and 34 hospi-
tals (40%) lost 11%–20%. Investigations established that there is a connection between
the loss of functionality and age, distance from fault line and ground motion. Critical sys-
tem functionality decreases when facility is closer to the source of hazard (i.e. high ground
motions, high intensity, and shorter distance from fault line), see Figure 6a and b. Systems
lose their functionality as they get older. This loss starts from an average age of 25 years,
(a)
(b)
Figure 1. Impact of age and seismic intensity on building integrity (Scb). (a) Age. (b) JMA seismic
intensity.
Achour and Miyajima 11
where systems lose approximately 6% and by the age of 44 years, this loss reaches approx-
imately 34%, see Figure 6c. However, when plotting hospital individual functionalities
against their ages, the functionality becomes relatively independent from the age (see
Figure 6d). This indicates that systems can preserve their functionality when they are well
maintained and that Japanese hospital internal systems are well maintained which explains
the relatively good performance they had following these strong earthquakes.
The critical systems have been classified according to the reported occurrence of loss of
functionality. Loss of water service was found in 53% of the facilities (N = 63) followed
by power supply in 31% (N = 37) and loss of elevator in 30% (N = 35), see Figure 7.
Most of the impact was rated as slight except for water, power, and gas supplies and furni-
ture and fixings which were rated as ‘‘severe’’ in some cases. Water, power, and gas supplies
are needed for medical activities, cooking and cleaning, and so on; any loss of functionality
will have an immediate effect on hospital operation (Achour et al., 2014), while fixings and
furniture damage can cause loss of supplies (often stored in shelves) and limit access to
areas and pathways when toppled over and thus the faster the critical systems are restored,
the faster the hospital functionality is restored.
The restoration of eight systems has been analyzed and plotted in Figure 8. Restoration
was complete by the 96th day for the water system and elevators. Some systems were
22% 26%
7% 4% 4%
22%
33%
15%
11%
15%
7%
4%
11%
4%
7%
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 2. Building integrity. (a) Post-1981 building integrity. (b) Pre-1981 building integrity. (c) Loss of
integrity distribution.
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restored much earlier, such as cellular phones (1 day), landline phones (15 days), and elec-
tric power (64 days). During interruption time, facilities managed their supply using alter-
native sources, such as water tanks, power generators, and in some cases through external
support, such as water tankers (e.g. H112). In the vast majority of the cases, these alterna-
tive sources mitigated the risks of inoperability; however, in some cases they caused larger
damage, such as in H137, where an elevated water tank’s additional pipework was dam-
aged and caused floods. Research work on alternative sources is limited as well as being
not well covered in regulations and standards making hospitals at risk of inoperability.
Figure 3. Effect of PGA on building integrity.
Figure 4. Impact of distance on building integrity.
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Approximately three out of four healthcare facilities lost on average 8.9% of their func-
tionality due to the failure of critical systems regardless of their emergency system classifi-
cation (see Table 8). Tertiary facilities suffered the largest loss estimated at 22.9%
(Scs = 77.1%) in H137. Further investigation revealed that H137 loss of functionality was
due to the short distance from the fault line, exposure to a substantial ground motion, and
age of its internal systems. All these have played a role in its loss of functionality (see
Table 6). It is also crucial to note that tertiary facilities depend heavily on critical systems
due to the acute health conditions they deal with which makes them suffer from interrup-
tion or failure of any critical systems more than the other categories.
In conclusion, critical systems were a major cause for healthcare failure. Their perfor-
mance depends on ground motion, seismic intensity, age, and maintenance. Water and
power systems are the cause of most loss of functionality following the 2016 Kumamoto
earthquakes. Alternative sources remain the best way to mitigate risk of system failure and
supply interruption; however, they also remain vulnerable and could even cause further
damage to hospitals.
Medical equipment
Approximately one-third of the hospitals (31%, N = 37) reported loss of functionality
due to equipment inoperability. Interruption of electric power and/or water supplies, phys-
ical damage was the main cause of this inoperability. Equipment are installed or located
inside hospital buildings and can be free standing or attached to the structure. They are
connected to the hospital’s internal systems and networks (e.g. power, water, IT) and thus
are heavily dependent on building and critical systems’ performance. Findings confirmed
this by establishing that there is similarity between the building and critical system func-
tionalities and that of equipment whereby functionality decreases when ground motion
and seismic intensity increase and when the hospital is closer to the fault line (see Figure
9). The findings also indicate that equipment tend to lose functionality as they get older
assuming that they are the same age as the building.
Further analysis was conducted to identify the causes of equipment loss of functionality
and its impact on the availability of service in the stricken areas. Table 9 illustrates the
number of equipment units classified per service and functionality, and Table 10 shows
the loss of functionality in each affected hospital in addition to the cause of this loss.
Table 7. [AQ: 7]Detailed analysis of the least performing hospitals
Hospital PGA Intensity Age Distance
(km)
Scb
(%)
SH
(%)
Simpact
(%)
EMS rating
H110 657 6.1 37 10 63 83 66 II
H240 273 5.7 35 9 100 86 70 II
H204 1330 5.7 25 20 91 86 86 N/A
H112 785 6.1 38 6 65 68 68 N/A
H137 767 6.1 43 7 100 67 60 III
H278 555 4.7 91 21 78 87 87 N/A
H68 726 6.1 83 11 100 94 94 N/A
PGA: peak ground acceleration.
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Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) units were the most affected equipment in the
stricken areas whereby 39% (N = 9) units failed to operate. These were followed by the
loss of 17% (N = 11) of file development machines, in addition to other equipment which
provide critical service, such as artificial dialysis. The stricken area is equipped with 20
artificial dialysis units, which provide service to chronically ill people who perhaps would
Figure 5. Assessment of building integrity.
Achour and Miyajima 15
not count as disaster-related injuries; however, their life would be compromised if the ser-
vice was interrupted. Three (15%) of these units failed to operate due to physical damage
and water shortage (see Tables 8 and 9). In addition, seven more (35%) were inoperable
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6. Influence of earthquake metrics and building age on the functionality of critical systems. (a)
PGA. (b) Building age. (c) Average loss of functionality and average age. (d) Distance from fault line.
Figure 7. Impact of critical service inoperability on hospital operations.
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for some time due to water shortage (e.g. in H22 and H249). These hospitals had to wait
for the water supply to be provided by external aid from the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)
and other organizations. This indicates that Japan has developed good learning process
throughout its disaster management experience as water was delivered to support hospital
operations, a point that was not picked up by some hospitals and their water suppliers in
the United Kingdom during the 2007 summer floods when water was delivered in bottles
and rendered this critical service inoperable (Department of Health (DH), 2008).
The dependency of equipment on critical lifelines (e.g. water and electric power) makes
them always subject to risk of inoperability. The availability of alternative sources has
mitigated the impact of critical system interruption in spite of the delay in some cases. The
challenge, however, is associated with modern technology whereby equipment is connected
to cyber networks, which adds another layer of complexity to the dependency challenge.
Further research will need to be conducted to identify how modern equipment will be
affected by the interruption of cyber networks.
Figure 8. Restoration of critical services.
Table 8. Loss of functionality associated with critical systems
Hospital Emergency
rating
Average loss
of functionality
(%)
Age
(years)
Distance
(km)
PGA
(cm/s2)
Intensity
(JMA scale)
– Unrated 9.0 28.1a
Emergency rated 8.8 24.7a
H73 Primary 7.2 11 11.3 834 6.1
H199 Secondary 7.5 35 41.3 783 4.7
H137 Tertiary 22.9 43 6.7 767 6.1
PGA: peak ground acceleration
aAverage age of associated facilities.
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Evacuations
Approximately 20% (N = 23) of the participating hospitals reported evacuation of
patients. The number of evacuees was plotted against the hospital functionality Simpact to
find that the number of evacuees increases as functionality decreases (see Figure 10).
Hospitals lose functionality due to damage to their buildings, critical systems, and equip-
ment, as established in previous sections. This limits the ability of the hospital to serve
patients, and in some cases they have to make a partial or full evacuation. Table 11 illus-
trates the number of evacuations, cause of evacuation, and type of evacuated patients in
each hospital. Over 740 patients were evacuated due to loss of functionality of the water
system (N = 13 hospitals), deterioration in building integrity (N = 10 hospitals), loss of
gas (N = 4 hospitals), and/or electric power (N = 3 hospitals) supplies. Table 11 illus-
trates that there is no connection between equipment functionality and evacuated patients;
however, the fact that five hospitals (4% of participating hospitals) reported evacuation of
dialysis patients indicates that medical equipment can also cause evacuation but this was
not well perceived by responders.
A further analysis of the evacuation and hospital functionality established that the deci-
sion for evacuation was made based on the safety of patients. Regardless of its severity,
building damage has been considered as a threat to the safety of patients. Figure 11 illus-
trates that the evacuation started around 5% loss of functionality for building integrity
(Scb = 95%) and for approximately 20% loss of functionality for critical systems
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 9. Influence of earthquake metrics and building age on equipment functionality. (a) Ground
motion. (b) Distance. (c) Seismic intensity. (d) Building age.
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(Scs = 80%) and equipment (Sce = 80%). This means that healthcare staff, patients, and
families think of evacuation when they see that building integrity is compromised. Staff
are more tolerant with failures of critical systems and equipment as these do not pose a
safety risk but delay the provision of medical care.
Discussion
This study established that the continuity of healthcare service depends on the functional-
ity of its building, critical systems, and medical equipment in addition to its level of prepa-
redness. It provided a comprehensive set of evidence through a broad and detailed analysis
of hospitals post-earthquake.
It is difficult to ascertain the connection between the building age and the propensity to
lose functionality; however, findings suggest that there is a tendency to do so. The strict-
ness of the current Japanese building standards has led to an improvement in the struc-
tural performance to earthquakes roughly estimated to 10%. Architectural components,
however, still cause problems to hospital functionality. These components hardly pose a
major risk to building collapse; however, their impact on functionality and the threat they
cause to hospital occupants (e.g. staff, patients, and relatives) is what is being argued in
this study. Hospitals suffered issues with their doors, floors, and ceilings which means that
there was an impact on the safety of movement within the building and perhaps could
have caused some injuries which have not been reported by the responding facilities or
could not be identified by this study. This strengthens the argument of this study where
more attention has to be given to architectural components as loss of functionality could
be caused by poor design and low construction quality. Building on their success in pro-
tecting structural components, Japanese regulations and building standards need to take
into consideration the design of architectural components to improve their performance
post-seismic activity. Distance from fault lines and ground motions are factors this revi-
sion needs to take into consideration.
Critical systems have always been a major issue for hospital functionality. Water and
electric power supplies are on the top of the list of affected and affecting systems as high-
lighted by many researchers. This study confirms previous research findings, which suggest
that electric power and water supplies are the most influential systems in hospital’s opera-
tion (Achour et al., 2014; Myrtle et al., 2005; Ochi et al., 2015). The importance of critical
systems lies in the role they play in the provision of specific services to operate wards,
maintain the comfort of hospital occupants, and connect the hospital with external
Table 9. Availability of equipment within the stricken area
Equipment Unusable Usable No. of units
X-ray 10 (11%) 80 (89%) 90
File developing machine 11 (17%) 53 (83%) 64
Blood test machine 9 (13%) 61 (87%) 70
CT 5 (10%) 46 (90%) 51
MRI 9 (39%) 14 (61%) 23
Cardiac catheter 2 (17%) 10 (83%) 12
Artificial dialyzer 3 (15%) 17 (85%) 20
Automatic divided powder plane 3 (4%) 68 (96%) 71
Nurse calling system 11 (11%) 91 (89%) 102
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services. Hospitals have always been encouraged to have alternative sources and to dupli-
cate service suppliers (e.g. telecommunication) to mitigate the impact associated with sup-
ply failure. The loss of functionality of critical systems can lead to partial or even total
evacuation of the hospital, as demonstrated by the findings of this study. The challenge,
however, is the absence of any assurance that these alternative sources will remain func-
tional, able to provide the necessary supply until main supply is restored, and do not cause
further disruption as seen in some hospitals (e.g. H137). Literature suggests that alternative
Table 10. Causes of medical equipment loss of functionality in each affected hospital
Hospital Medical
emergency
system
Equipment and cause of interruption
Artificial
dialyzer
X-ray File
developing
machine
Blood
test
machine
CT MRI Cardiac
Catheter
Life
support
system
Automatic
divided
powder
plane
Nurse
calling
system
H1 Second W – – W – D – – – –
H9 – – – W – – – – – – –
H23 First – E E – – – – – E E
H36 Second – D – – D D – – – –
H66 – – D – – – – – – – –
H68 – Wd – – – – – – – – –
H70 – W – – D – – – – – –
H88 First – – – D – – – – – –
H111 Third Wd – – – – – – – – E, D
H112 – – O – – – – – – – D
H117 – – – O – – – – – – –
H119 – – – – – – D – – – –
H123 – – O – – – – – – – –
H128 – – – UnKn W – – – – – –
H135 – – – UnKn – – – – – – –
H137 Third E E UnKn – – – – – – E
H143 – – D – – – – – – D –
H147 – – D UnKn – – – – – – –
H166 – – E UnKn – – – – – – E
H182 – E – – – – D – – – –
H199 Second – E E E E E – – – –
H204 – – – – – – D – – – –
H210 – – D UnKn – – – – – – O
H238 Third – – – E – – – – – –
H240 Second – – – – – O – – – UnKn
H248 Second – – – – E D E – – –
H254 – – – – – – – – – – E
H257 First O – – – – – – – – –
H266 – – – – – – – – – – UnKn
H269 – – – – – – – – – – UnKn
H282 First D, Wd – – D – – – – – –
H286 – Wd – – – – – – – – –
H292 Second – – – – – – – – – –
H295 – – – – D – – – – – –
H321 Second – – – – O D O – – –
H325 – – – – E – – – – E E
W: Water; Wd: Delayed water supply E: Electric power; D: physical damage; UnKn: Unknown; O: Other.
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sources have always been an issue for the operation of healthcare for many decades as sug-
gested by Jones and Mar (1945). This indicates that hospital authorities, and perhaps regu-
lators, need to pay further attention to the continuity of critical systems to mitigate their
risk of failure. The older the hospitals get, the closer to the fault line they are and the more
ground motion they are exposed to dictate the level of preparedness they need to consider.
This might be a challenge for countries where seismic information is not available; how-
ever, for Japan, it might be much easier due to the availability of historical data in addition
to a substantial network of seismographs that detect and measure the ground motions and
fault lines accurately.
Critical system failure affects hospital functionality independently from their emergency
classification, primary, secondary, tertiary, or non-classified. Tertiary, however, get
affected much harder due to the critical and delicate nature of their operations and the
cases they deal with at all times. Tertiary hospitals do not just require continuous supplies
but also quality of this supply due to their heavy reliance on these critical systems to main-
tain service and operate equipment. The study findings established that equipment are part
of the functionality of hospitals and that their inoperability affects not just the quality of
service but also could expose patients to serious threats (e.g. artificial dialyzer). It is inter-
esting to see that hospitals did not recognize the value of equipment. This is perhaps due
to the substantial impact associated with the interruption of critical systems. Further
Table 11. Causes of hospital evacuations and patient transfers
Hospital Bed
capacity
(bed)
Hospital
functionality
score (%)
Post-
earthquake
3-day admission
(people)
Cause Transferred patients
Building Critical
system
Equipment Number
(people)
Type
H1 199 66.3 10 O W – All Inp.
H37 103 91.7 232 – 1 Inp.
H42 19 78.1 0 O G, W – 16 Inp.
H68 16 93.8 60 W – 7 Dialys.
H70 19 87.7 16 – W – 31 Dialys.
H73 9 61.6 26 – W, E – 1 Inp.
H110 544 66.0 0 O – – 200 Inp.
H111 490 84.0 625 O – – Unknown Inp.
H112 14 67.9 0 O W – 8 Inp.
H119 19 86.8 11 O W, G – 2 Inp.
H123 6 77.4 30 – E, W – 3 Outp.
H130 39 88.3 25 O W, G – 35 Inp.
H135 19 92.2 0 – W, G – Unknown Inp.
H137 19 60.4 22 – W – 6 Inp.
H139 18 91.5 54 O – – 14 Dialys and Inp.
H140 19 87.2 0 – E, W – 5 Inp.
H161 19 95.5 182 – W – 3 Inp.
H177 19 97.2 40 – – – Unknown Inp.
H199 140 60.8 22 – – – 1 Inp.
H210 19 68.6 20 – – – 17 Inp.
H240 308 68.6 135 O – – 187 Inp.
H249 18 93.7 0 O – – 19 Dialys. and Inp.
H282 10 58.2 45 – – – 2 Dialys.
E = Electric power; G = Gas supply; W = Water supply; Inp = Inpatient; Outp = Outpatient; Dialys.= Dialysis patient.
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research is needed into the role equipment play following disasters to understand the
extent of this role.
Building integrity, critical systems and equipment, and other factors have been con-
firmed to have a strong effect on the functionality of healthcare facilities post-disasters.
The decision of hospital evacuations was mainly driven by the integrity of its building and
then continuity of its critical systems and equipment. However, factors, such as attendance
of healthcare staff, are also determinants to the functionality of hospitals and thus can dic-
tate total or partial evacuations as demonstrated by the statement of one of the hospital
(H278) responders who stated: ‘‘In order to bring off nurse staff members to work, I set up
an emergency child nursery school.’’ This complexity and intertwined complexity demon-
strate that the resilience of healthcare functionality is beyond its infrastructure and systems
and should include new variables that need to be integrated. Achour and Ka¨hko¨nen (2017)
propose the ‘‘jigsaw concept’’ in building disaster resilience by ensuring that all
Figure 10. Influence of hospital functionality on patient evacuation.
Figure 11. Building, critical systems, and equipment functionalities effect on evacuation.
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components work together in a cohesive way to maintain operation. This concept fits well
with this study as per above. Any damage or interruption to any of these components will
affect the functionality of the healthcare service. The WHO HSI (WHO, 2015) supports
this concept by integrating over 110 check points about structural, non-structural, and
functional components to provide an estimate of hospital functionality before disasters.
[AQ: 8]
This study argues that all healthcare facilities play a role post-disaster in spite of their
classification in the emergency system. Findings established that unclassified healthcare
facilities under the emergency system have made significant contributions to their commu-
nities and accepted and treated patients/injuries during the disaster response period.
Commonly, researchers focus on primary, secondary, and tertiary hospitals. This approach
is perhaps good to understand how emergency care responds to disasters but it does not
provide accurate information about how healthcare service responds. Post-disaster health-
care functionality needs further exploration and there is an urgent need to understand how
the entire healthcare service responds to major disasters, such as earthquakes. Earthquakes
are among the best disaster scenarios that can provide information about the resilience
state of healthcare due to their ability to overstretch and reduce resources as well as create
a surge in demand in a very short time. The findings of such research will inform the inter-
national efforts and agendas (e.g. Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 –
2030) about the current status of healthcare and gaps where more work is needed.
A number of limitations have been identified in this study. These are related to the
assessment which was conducted by hospitals and thus could include some bias or inaccu-
racy which might have affected the scoring and thus the loss of functionality. Ideally, the
perfect case study would include detailed structural damage assessments for each facility
in addition to hospital functionality, but alas, suitable engineering impact reports were not
available for our analyses. Nonetheless, the data collected from the perspective of hospital
functionality are unique and valuable in their own right. The results of this study might
not reflect the exact response of the healthcare system in the stricken areas due to the fact
that the response rate was approximately 30%.
Conclusion
This study investigated the impact of damage on the performance of the healthcare service
following the 2016 Kumamoto earthquakes. It established the connection between hospital
functionality and seismic metrics to identify the causes of healthcare failure in some hospi-
tals and the reasons for their partial and total evacuation.
Findings established that there is connection between the loss of functionality and the
seismic metrics, specifically ground motion, distance from fault line, and seismic intensity.
Hospital age is another factor that has a potential connection with loss of functionality;
however, the good maintenance is what kept hospitals perform well despite their age.
Hospitals were evacuated mainly because of building damage and damage to critical sys-
tems in the first instance. Equipment was an indirect cause for the evacuation of some
patients, specifically those with chronic conditions.
Hospitals whether they are classified as emergency responders or not play a significant
role during major disasters not just in dealing with the injuries but also in maintaining a
routine healthcare service. More research is needed to understand the functionality and
role all healthcare facilities play post-disasters to understand how healthcare systems
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operate on the ground. This will help enhance healthcare resilience and will identify more
factors which perhaps have not been investigated sufficiently. Further research is also
needed to develop the current assessment approach and find ways to increase data’s inter-
nal consistency.
The resilience of healthcare provision depends on the functionality of its infrastructure,
and supporting services and suppliers. This study demonstrated that there is a connection
between the level of preparedness and the probability of losing functionality. It concludes
by emphasizing the importance to revise regulations and standards to protect architectural
and critical system components and to conduct more research about the capability of staff
attending their workplace, role of equipment post-disasters, and encourages more research
into the evaluation of healthcare post-disasters.
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